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EMERGING STANDARDS FOR SUSTAINABLE
FINANCE OF THE ENERGY SECTOR
by Kirk Herbertson and David Hunter*
INTRODUCTION
he energy sector relies heavily on large-scale projects,
advanced technology, and complex infrastructure, and
thus relies heavily on project finance and other investments from international financial institutions (“IFIs”). Worldwide, the average annual investment in energy is around U.S.
$413 billion.1 This amount is increasing, particularly in the
developing world. Developing countries will require an estimated annual investment in electricity of U.S. $165 billion
through 2010, which will increase about three percent per year
through 2030.2 Because of the magnitude of their investments in
the energy sector, IFIs have the potential to profoundly affect
future energy paths.
Because of this influence, civil society advocates are pressuring IFIs to develop a variety of environmental and social policies that can influence the types of energy projects they will
finance and how those projects must be implemented. Through
these efforts, many energy-related projects have been scrutinized
(and in some cases rejected) for their contributions to severe
environmental degradation, involuntary resettlement of poor and
marginalized communities, or the inequitable allocation of project benefits and costs. Controversy around such projects affects
the availability and conditionality of international finance for
future proposed energy projects. More recently, civil society
activists have also begun to focus on the climate change impacts
of IFI energy lending, and have begun to push changes they hope
will shift IFI lending portfolios away from fossil fuel projects
towards renewable energy or energy efficiency investments.
These trends can be expected to continue in the future, with
increasingly strict standards applying to the energy sector.
This article surveys the environmental and social policies at
the IFIs as they relate to the energy sector. After discussing the
general impacts of IFIs on the energy sector, the article describes
existing and emerging environmental and social policies that
impact IFI support for the energy sector. This survey then
addresses policies relating to general development impacts, climate change policies, and policies aimed at specific energy sectors (such as dams, renewables, or nuclear energy).

THE EMERGING ENVIRONMENTAL
AND SOCIAL STANDARDS FOR IFIS
At least among public IFIs, the World Bank Group is the
recognized leader for influencing developing countries’ economic and development paths. The World Bank Group is comprised of four separate, but related, financial institutions: the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(“IBRD”), the International Development Association (“IDA”),
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Construction of hydro-electric dams, such as this one in Tajikistan, often causes
substantial social and environmental harm.

the International Finance Corporation (“IFC”), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”).3 IBRD and IDA
provide loans to support public-sector projects. Together IBRD
and IDA are most frequently referred to as the “World Bank.”
The primary difference between the IBRD and IDA is that IDA
provides concessional or low-cost loans to the poorest countries
(those having per capita annual income below U.S. $1065 in
2005 dollars).4 The IBRD provides loans to other developing
countries and countries in economic transition at a near-market
rate with longer repayment terms than commercial loans. The
IFC and MIGA provide financial support to private sector projects in all developing countries or countries in economic transition. IFC makes loans and equity investments in private sector
projects. MIGA provides insurance against political risks faced
by private sector investments in developing countries (i.e. risks
from civil unrest or war).
The World Bank Group is the largest source for development financing in the world. Each year the Group supports
approximately U.S. $20 billion in projects and leverages an additional U.S. $50 billion from other financial institutions. From
1992 to 2004, the World Bank Group financed approximately
U.S. $28 billion towards fossil fuel projects.5 But the influence
of the World Bank Group extends far beyond the monetary value
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of its investments. The Group is the recognized intellectual
leader among development organizations, often setting precedents for other institutions to follow. The Group’s influence is
expanded further by coordinating with other donors, mobilizing
bilateral and increasingly private-sector financing, conducting
policy research, and providing technical assistance to borrowing
countries.
Beginning in the 1970s, independent observers began to
recognize that the World Bank and other IFIs were providing
support for some of the most environmentally damaging projects
taking place in developing countries. These projects, including
several large energy infrastructure projects, were often associated with allegations of severe environmental destruction, human
rights abuses, and long-term
harm to the economic well-being
of the poor in the project area.
Even assuming good intentions,
the size and scale of many of the
projects simply dwarfed the
legal and policy infrastructure of
the borrowing country.6
In response, pressure from
environmental and human rights
groups pushed IFIs to address
the sustainable development
impacts of the projects they
finance.7 As part of their
response, first the World Bank,
and then other IFIs, adopted
environmental and social policy
frameworks that provide certain
protections for local communities affected by the projects. The environmental assessment policy is the cornerstone of the Bank’s safeguard policy system. All
World Bank-financed projects are screened into three categories
depending on the extent of environmental impacts associated
with the project. “Category A” projects, which have “significant
adverse impacts that may be sensitive, irreversible and diverse,”
must undergo a full environmental assessment, with specific
requirements for consultation and disclosure. “Category B”
projects have adverse impacts that “are less significant than Category A impacts. Preparation of a mitigatory plan suffices for
many Category B projects.” “Category C” projects normally do
not require any environmental analysis “because the project is
unlikely to have adverse impacts.”8 In general, about ten percent
of World Bank projects are classified as Category A, and significantly more (57 percent in 2005) are classified as Category B. In
addition to environmental assessment, the World Bank environmental and social policies include, among other things, specific
policies relating to involuntary resettlement, indigenous peoples,
and natural habitats.
Other IFIs, including multilateral development banks
(“MDBs”) such as the Asian Development Bank and the InterAmerican Development Bank, commercial banks such as
Citibank and ABN Amro, and export credit and insurance agen-

cies (“ECAs”) such as the U.S. Export-Import Bank and the
UK’s Export Credits Guarantee Department, have all followed
the World Bank Group’s lead in developing environmental and
social standards. Even though many of these IFIs do not share
the World Bank’s development mandate, they increasingly
understand that setting environmental and social requirements
for projects lowers project risk and the institution’s own reputational risk.9 Thus, for example, ECAs, which are bilateral agencies that provide project finance, guarantees, or insurance to
promote a country’s exports and investments abroad, adopted the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”) Recommendations on Common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export Credits.10 While the
OECD Common Approaches
bind the ECAs to relatively few
commitments, they explicitly
require ECAs to benchmark
their projects against other environmental and social standards,
including those of the World
Bank Group’s safeguard policies.11 Many individual ECAs
have also adopted more specific
environmental and social policies that have significant implications for their support of the
energy sector.12
Perhaps even more importantly, in 2003, a group of leading commercial banks committed
to adhere to the “Equator Principles,” which essentially incorporate the IFC’s environmental and social standards.13 The
Principles have now been adopted by commercial banks that collectively arrange more than 80 percent of all international project finance in developing countries.14 In addition, many of these
commercial banks have issued separate environmental and
social policies that go well beyond the requirements of the Equator Principles (or those of the IFC).15

Observers began to
recognize that the
World Bank and other
IFIs were providing
support for some of the
most environmentally
damaging projects in
developing countries.
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POLICIES IMPLICATING THE ENERGY SECTOR
For the most part, IFI environmental and social policies
have not specifically targeted the energy sector. Although the
World Bank, for example, has developed lending strategies for
the energy sector, no policy establishes environmental and social
conditions specifically for energy-sector lending. Nonetheless,
concern over the development impacts, and more recently the
climate impacts, of the energy sector have led to policies that
directly bear on the future of IFI financial support.

DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS
Many of the most controversial projects supported by IFIs in
recent years have been energy projects. These projects have
engendered stiff international opposition from civil society networks, primarily motivated by a belief that these projects do not
provide sufficient development benefits for, and impose unacceptSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

ably high costs on, local affected communities. In some instances,
these campaigns led to stronger environmental and social conditionalities being placed on the projects, including for example the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (environmental and human rights
conditions),16 the Chad-Cameroon pipeline (environmental and
revenue management requirements),17 and the Sakhalin II Oil and
Gas project off of Russia (expanded protections of whales and
salmon habitat).18 Some projects were precluded from receiving
financial support from specific institutions, including the Camisea
pipeline in Peru (financing rejected by the U.S. Export-Import
Bank due to environmental and social concerns),19 and China’s
massive Three Gorges dam (both the World Bank and the U.S.
Export-Import Bank refused financial support).20 Still others have
been cancelled (or at least delayed) due to these campaigns,
including the Ilisu hydroelectric dam in Turkey21 and Uganda’s
Bujagali dam.22
These projects were delayed,
modified, or cancelled because
of their failure to meet the environmental and social conditions
that IFIs placed on them, in
order to improve the development impacts. Although the
environmental and social policies applicable to each project
depend both on the proposed
lending institutions and the project’s specific impacts, in general the policies fall into five
categories: (1) policies relating
to environmental and social assessment; (2) policies relating
to information disclosure23 and community consultation;24
(3) policies intended to ensure full compensation to people
involuntarily resettled;25 (4) policies meant to protect the rights
and interests of indigenous peoples;26 and (5) policies meant to
protect critical natural habitats. Most of the IFIs mentioned
above have adopted their own policies or follow the World Bank
Group’s policies on these issues.
In addition to the normative framework found in the environmental and social policies, at least nine financial institutions
have also adopted some form of accountability mechanism that
enables affected people to raise concerns regarding compliance
with the IFIs’ environmental and social policies. Beginning with
the creation of the World Bank Inspection Panel in 1993, five
multilateral financial institutions27 and three bilateral financial
institutions28 currently provide locally-affected people access to
accountability mechanisms. Although the effectiveness and
independence of these mechanisms vary, they collectively provide significant new opportunities for challenges to future
energy projects.

of finance in sectors with substantial greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emission footprints, including transport, oil and gas, electric
power, and mining.”29 The report calculates that 27 percent of the
World Bank’s lending in 2004 went toward these projects, with
an investment of U.S. $7.6 billion. Since the signing of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) in
1992, the World Bank Group has financed over U.S. $28.4 billion
in fossil fuel projects, resulting in 43.3 billion tons of lifetime
carbon emissions.30 Other MDBs are similarly committed to
projects that contribute substantially to GHG emissions. In 2004,
the Inter-American Development Bank invested U.S. $730 million (twelve percent of its total lending), and in 2003 the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development invested U.S.
$3.3 billion (27 percent of its total lending), in projects with
potentially substantial impacts on the climate.31
Closer review of the World
Bank shows the influence of the
banks, and their connection to
climate change. In addition to its
direct financing, the World Bank
is also an implementing agency
of the Global Environment
Facility (“GEF”), which among
other roles, acts as the financial
mechanism for the UNFCCC.32
Through its Carbon Finance
Unit,33 the Bank launched the
Prototype Carbon Fund in 2000
and continues to champion the
global carbon market, by financing the purchase of emission credits under the Kyoto Protocol’s
Clean Development Mechanism. The Bank’s influence is
expanded further by coordinating other donors, mobilizing bilateral private-sector financing, conducting policy research, and
providing technical assistance to borrowing countries.
In recent years, the IFIs have begun to recognize that the climate change policy landscape has changed and that this may
lead to new financing conditionalities and a need to change their
energy portfolios. Almost every country in the world has signed
the 1992 UNFCCC and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Under Kyoto,
all industrialized countries, except the United States and Australia, have committed to mandatory timetable and targets for
reducing emissions. As a result, many regional, national, and
sub-national governments throughout the world have created
policies to regulate GHG emissions, and many have established
carbon trading systems.34
Even though emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol
do not apply to developing countries, climate change is now recognized as a major development issue, requiring more direct
attention from development institutions. For example, climate
change impacts must now be included in the environmental
assessments required by the World Bank and most other IFIs.35
In addition, IFC’s new Performance Standards require projects
with annual GHG emissions greater than 100,000 tons to estimate and report their emissions annually.36

Many of the most
controversial projects
supported by IFIs in
recent years have been
energy projects.

CLIMATE CHANGE
The impact of IFIs on climate change is clear and significant. The World Resources Institute (“WRI”) reports that “[t]he
lending profile of MDBs demonstrates significant concentrations
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Other IFIs are also beginning to respond to climate change
with new policies that may restrict or change their lending practices. Private commercial banks, which are increasingly exposed
to climate risks, are beginning to account for these risks in the
costs of their loans and other services.37 Many commercial
banks have started to reduce their own internal carbon footprint,
with HSBC having achieved carbon neutrality in 2005.38 At least
four private commercial banks—Bank of America, Citibank,
JPMorganChase, and HSBC—have specific policies addressing
the climate impacts of their lending portfolios. JPMorganChase
has committed to work with its largest GHG-emitting clients
to develop carbon mitigation plans, which include measuring
and disclosing GHG emissions and developing strategies to
reduce or offset them. Starting in 2006, the bank began
reporting annually on GHG emissions from its power portfolio
and working with clients to develop new financial products that
facilitate emission reductions. Bank of America’s policy is noteworthy because it includes a reduction target that commits the
bank to reduce emissions from its energy and utility portfolios
by seven percent by 2008. Neither Citigroup nor HSBC have
specific commitments relating to emissions reductions or carbon
mitigation plans, although Citigroup has committed to reporting
on emissions resulting from its energy sector lending.39 Export
credit agencies can also be expected to shift their climate policies, as part of their home country’s national climate or environmental policies.40
To be sure, the IFIs’ current climate-related policies make
only modest commitments and their implementation appears to
be insufficient. According to WRI, for example, “[o]ver 80 percent of World Bank’s publicly disclosed lending in the energy
sector from 2000 to 2004 did not consider climate change issues
in project appraisals and documentation.”41 Nonetheless, clear
trends are emerging that IFIs will increasingly have to commit at
least to: (1) assessing and reporting on climate emissions and
impacts; (2) reducing GHG emissions at the transactional and
portfolio levels; and (3) shifting towards clean energy technologies.42 Indeed, recently civil society is beginning to push for the
complete withdrawal of international financial assistance to the
fossil fuel industry.43 As climate impacts become more urgent,
such pressure will build and we can expect more stringent policy
responses from the IFIs.

RENEWABLE ENERGY PORTFOLIOS
Closely related to the push for a response to climate change
have been policies aimed at promoting renewable energy. Thus
far, IFIs have been slow to shift their energy sector portfolios in
the direction of renewable energy. The IBRD has committed to
increasing its lending for renewables by twenty percent per
year,44 but this is a modest increase given that renewable lending
starts from such a low baseline. In fiscal year 2005, for instance,
the IBRD’s financing for renewable energy projects comprised
less than five percent of its overall lending to the energy sector.45
In its September 2006 Investment Framework for Clean Energy
and Development, the IBRD does not make further commitments to sustainable energy practices, and continues to rely on
fossil fuel projects to meet the energy needs of the poor.46
7

Other IFIs have made only limited commitments to increasing their renewable energy portfolios. In May 2005, OECD
countries participating in the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, established special financial terms to
favor renewable energy projects. For a trial period from 1 July
2005 to 1 July 2007, participating ECAs agreed to give borrowers for renewable energy projects extended repayment terms of
fifteen years (an improvement over the twelve year terms generally offered to power plants).47 This fell short of the calls by civil
society groups pushing for ECA reforms, which called for: (1)
developing a sustainable energy portfolio, requiring a phase-out
of support to fossil fuel and other unsustainable energy technologies within two years; (2) committing twenty percent of the
total energy portfolio within two years to supporting sustainable
energy; (3) introducing institutional reforms and capacity building measures to abolish preferences for fossil fuels and nuclear
technology; (4) providing the lowest interest rates and maximum
repayment terms available under existing guidelines to support
renewable energy, energy efficiency, and conservation projects;
and (5) establishing a Renewable Energy Advisory Committee
composed of representatives of the renewable energy sector,
civil society, and government officials to make a series of recommendations.48 These or similar requests are likely to form the
civil society platforms for future IFI reforms.

DAMS
Large hydro-electric dams have long been a lightning rod
for civil society campaigns around IFI financing. Financing for
projects such as China’s Three Gorges dam, India’s Narmada
dam, Turkey’s Ilisu dam and Uganda’s Bujagali dam, have all
sparked considerable controversy, and in the cases of the Ilisu
and Bujagali dams, international financing (from the World
Bank group) was rejected. Nonetheless, in part as a response to
climate change, many IFIs are now calling for greater use of
hydropower. The World Bank Group, for example, considers
large scale dams to be a key component of its renewable energy
portfolios.49 Of the U.S. $748 million that the Bank financed in
fiscal year 2005 for “renewable energy and energy efficiency,”
approximately 60 percent went towards hydropower with capacity of over ten megawatts.50
Many civil society organizations have argued that large
scale hydropower cannot be considered a viable renewable
energy alternative. Large dam projects have displaced between
40 and 80 million people worldwide, in addition to the millions
displaced by canals, powerhouses, and other infrastructure associated with dams.51 In many cases, IFIs, governments, and project proponents have not provided displaced communities with
viable resettlement plans or adequate compensation, shattering
the livelihoods of these persons.52 At the same time, dams have
caused irreversible impacts to local habitats and water basins.53
Because of their methane emissions, GHG emissions from large
dams have often exceeded the emissions of conventional fossil
fuel power plants generating equivalent amounts of energy.54
Furthermore, dams often do not run efficiently or meet their
power generation targets, and often suffer lengthy construction
delays and large cost overruns.55
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

Because of these and related concerns, the World Bank constituted a World Commission on Dams (“WCD”) in 1997 to provide an independent assessment of the future of large dams. The
highly acclaimed WCD report provided several recommendations in 2000, including that IFIs should: (1) use comprehensive
options assessments as a risk mitigation tool; (2) incorporate the
WCD principles, criteria, and guidelines into their environmental and social policies, and use the guidelines as minimum
screens for evaluating support for, and investment in, individual
projects; (3) develop legally binding environmental and social
provisions in their insurance coverage, and debt and equity
arrangements; and (4) develop criteria for bond-rating systems
for use in financing all options, including large dams, in the
water resources and electric power sectors.56 Despite its initial
support, however, the World Bank rejected the WCD’s recommendations and the Banks’ environmental and social policies do
not currently meet the WCD
standards with respect to issues
such as human rights, indigenous peoples, social assessments, and transboundary
impacts.57 The IFC’s Policy and
Performance Standards follow
many, but not all, of the main
recommendations of the WCD.
Most importantly, the IFC does
not emphasize the human rights
of affected peoples to the same
degree as the WCD. The only
IFIs to explicitly incorporate the WCD recommendations are the
commercial banks HSBC and ABN Amro.58 Because most IFIs
do not have proper safeguards in place for dam projects, their
reliance on hydropower as a renewable alternative to oil and coal
will likely continue to engender substantial controversy and
opposition among civil society organizations.

for nuclear power to contribute to a twenty percent decline in
carbon emissions across the world, there would have to be three
to four times more reactors. This would cost trillions of dollars,
draining resources that could be spent on developing emissions
free technologies.62 Because nuclear power is also a “base-load
technology” whose energy output runs continuously, nuclear
energy cannot be adjusted to specific consumer and industrial
demands, and thus does not create incentives for energy consumers to shift to more efficient, sustainable energy use.63
Furthermore, there are enormous environmental and public
health risks associated with nuclear power. As WWF describes,
“The entire commercial chain of the processing of nuclear raw
materials from nuclear mining; operating nuclear power stations;
handling nuclear waste and finally re-processing, is full of leaks
and contamination and produces a highly toxic legacy for
thousands of years to come.”64 Nuclear power is also a “powergrid based technology,” which
means that these projects would
be much more unlikely to
extend energy access to the
world’s poorest, remote communities.65 For these reasons, the
European ECA Reform Campaign recommended that a
responsible ECA sustainable
energy policy (which is applicable to all IFIs) should include
the following elements: (1) the
IFI will not fund new nuclear
projects or the expansion of old or delayed projects; and (2) the
IFI “may offer support to help decommission nuclear installations or improve the safety of a running nuclear power plant,
but only if this safety improvement does not prolong the life of
the plant.”66

IFIs have been slow to
shift their energy sector
portfolios in the direction
of renewable energy.

NUCLEAR POLICIES
Except for one loan to Italy in 1959, the World Bank Group
does not support nuclear power, primarily out of concerns that it
is non-economic and never a least-cost solution.59 Indeed, the
only multilateral development bank that directly supports
nuclear power is the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, which has supported the construction and modernization of nuclear power plants in the former Soviet bloc.
Nonetheless, the World Bank and other IFIs increasingly consider nuclear power projects as a non-fossil fuel option for
reducing emissions, acid rain, and air pollution,60 and the multilateral reluctance to support nuclear power has not carried over
to the ECAs, which play a significant role in promoting nuclear
power technology around the world. According to one study,
fourteen of the 25 nuclear reactors under construction in 2001
were supported by ECA financing.61
The renewed interest in nuclear power concerns many
civil society organizations because it is essentially “replacing
one evil with another.” Nuclear power plants contribute fewer
emissions than coal or oil, but are not emissions free. In order
SPRING 2007

FUTURE TRENDS
IFIs are in a key position to provide leadership in the
shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy that must be part
of a global response to climate change. Moreover, the development mandates of many of the IFIs should force them to
consider the potential positive and negative development
impacts of such a shift, and will likely lead them to continue to
expand their environmental and social conditionality on energy
lending. This trend will be fueled by civil society’s continued
calls for stronger policies, to address both climate and development impacts.
Clear trends in the IFI environmental and social policies
are evident. These policies have become increasingly salient
to energy lending over time and have formed the basis for successful civil society campaigns to delay, prevent or improve
environmentally and socially harmful projects.67 But although
progress has been made, the IFIs’ policies have failed to
keep pace with advances in clean energy technology and
knowledge about climate change. Additionally, civil society
organizations continue to criticize the weaknesses of existing
safeguard policies, for example: (1) many policies fall far short
8

of current international law and norms; (2) policies do not
comprehensively address the full range of environmental and
social impacts of IFIs’ activities; (3) policies are often limited
only to project finance; (4) many policies allow only for limited
and inconsistent stakeholder involvement; (5) the language of
many policies is crafted so that IFIs do not actually commit to
any particular action; and (6) many policies have not been well
implemented.68 In some cases, as with climate change policies,
a few commercial banks have surpassed the safeguards of
the World Bank and other public institutions. Furthermore,
there continues to be lack of full implementation of safeguard
policies.

CONCLUSION
As concern over climate change continues, we can expect
more pressure to build on IFIs to restrict their fossil-fuel energy
portfolios and to expand their lending to other sectors. Existing
policies and approaches with respect to renewables, energy efficiency, dams, and nuclear power will likely be revisited and
serve as flashpoints for future policy dialogue. Expansion of relatively new energy sources, most notably biofuels, will likely
also launch substantial debates (and future policies) on their
development impacts.69 New IFI policies that emerge from those
debates will likely continue to shape the path of energy development in the future.
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